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Four centuries of bastardy in England
A remarkable feature of English demographic history is the explosion in childbearing outside marriage during the last quarter of the twentieth century, after 400 years of relative stability. Figure 1 plots the number of live births outside marriage per 1000 live births between 1845 and 2003. With the exception of a 'spike' at the end of the Second World War (peaking at 9.3%), the percentage of births outside marriage stayed within the range of 3.9 to 7.0% between 1845 and 1960. In the late 16 th century it was about 3%, fell to 1% percent in the mid-17 th century, and then rose to about 6% at the beginning of the 19 th century (Laslett 1977, Fig.3.2) . Thus, over 400 years, the proportion of births outside marriage moved within a relatively narrow range.
In the 17 th and 18 th centuries, childbearing outside marriage was associated with courtship. The fact that premarital childbearing tended to be higher when marriage ages were lower, and that the age at first 'illegitimate' birth was approximately equal to the age at first marriage (Laslett, 1980; Oosterveen et al, 1980) ), suggest that it was part of the courtship process. In times when general marriage opportunities were good there would be more courtship, hence more sexual activity, and more risk of non-marital births when, for a number of reasons, a particular marriage failed to take place. Wrightson (1980, p.190) interprets the proportion of births outside marriage in seventeenth century England as "an index of the degree of disjunction between socially acceptable premarital sexual activity and particular marital opportunities." This paper focuses on the last 160 years, particularly the period since 1870. It aims to explain fluctuations in non-marital childbearing during the period of relative stability and the explosion in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Background: Fertility and Birth Control, 1845-1940 Figure 1 also shows the evolution of fertility since 1845, as measured by the General Fertility Rate (GFR). Fertility began its steep long-term fall in the second half of the 1870s, reaching a low point just before the Second World War. The GFR was not this low again until the end of the twentieth century. It is important for the analysis of non-marital childbearing to consider how fertility was controlled to produce the long fertility decline, during which births outside marriage were usually less than 5%. Szreter (1996, pp.398-9) argues convincingly that 'attempted abstinence within marriage was the single most widespread and frequently used method of birth control' during the long decline, particularly before the First World War. He identifies (p.420) 'conscious, attempted abstinence to restrict births as the main cause of reduced coital frequency in the late Victorian and Edwardian period. … a public discourse explicitly promoting the virtues of sexual continence , primarily on moral and health grounds was, in fact, consciously developed and elaborated during this period.' Research by Cook (2004) reinforces Szreter's conclusion: 'Abstinence within marriage was a course of desperation that could be sustained only by imposition of a repressive sexual and emotional culture, initially by individuals of their own accord, and then, as they internalised those dictates, upon succeeding generations. ' (p.161) Throughout the nineteenth century, premarital sex continued to be a part of courting behaviour among working class people. As Cook (2004, p.17) explains, …individual caution backed up by community sanctions stopped most couples from marrying unless they had sufficient savings and income to support a new separate household containing wife and children. Premarital sexual intercourse was regulated by this system. Most unmarried women would not have sexual intercourse except with a partner who had a agreed to marriage, and the man would not make this offer until he could afford to do so. Note that this is not the same as delaying intercourse until marriage was imminent…There was probably considerable leeway if the woman did not become pregnant. ' Cook argues that the decline in the percentage of births outside marriage between 1870 and 1900 reflected the spread of a culture of sexual restraint: 'The falling illegitimacy rates are evidence of women's increasing sexual caution and diminishing opportunity to relaxed premarital sexual activity…' (Cook, p.105) . It spread from the middle-class to the working classes. From the 1870s, the slowing down of urbanisation 'led to establishment of more settled working class communities enabling women (and parents) to establish networks of support and surveillance.
Respectability was increasingly central to working-class women's identity.' (Cook, . While increasingly repressed, premarital sex remained an important part of courting behaviour among working class people into the early twentieth century. Having intercourse marked a point in courtship, a staging post en route to marriage and household formation.
Birth control during the inter-war years was similar to the preceding fifty years. Low marital birth rates in 1930s were primarily attained through intended low coital frequencies-the reported levels of birth control use (even if underreported) and the low effectiveness of these methods cannot account for low birth rate. The culture of sexual restraint supported abstinence as the main control on marital fertility and kept births outside marriage low. While knowledge about contraception improved during the inter-war years, the unmarried had difficulty obtaining such information.
Outline of paper
The next section demonstrates that, up to the First World War, fluctuations in the percentage of births outside marriage responded to the unemployment rate. Higher unemployment discouraged marriage and increased non-marital births, which is consistent with poorer labour market conditions discouraging marriages among pregnant would-be brides, thereby increasing bastardy. This is further support for the hypothesis that non-marital childbearing is associated with courtship. During the inter-war period, higher unemployment continued to produce postponement of marriages, but non-marital childbearing was no longer linked to unemployment.
The remainder of the paper considers the period after World War II. An important technological change dominates this period: the introduction of the contraceptive pill in 1961. Section 3 shows that the increase in the percentage of births outside marriage from 9% in 1975 to 42% in 2003 is mainly accounted for by a large fall in the proportion of women aged 20-34 who are married. This is in turn associated with a dramatic rise in cohabiting unions. As these unions are short-lived before either dissolving or being converted into marriage, non-marital childbearing appears, therefore, to be associated with modern courtship. Section 4 presents a theory of marriage market search (courtship) in which out-of-wedlock childbearing may be a rational choice, and Section 5 explains how it can become widespread when a woman's welfare as a single mother is influenced by the prevalence of single mothers in the population. If this social influence model is valid, then it is likely to be the case that socio-economic differences in the chances of having a child before marriage widen as childbearing outside marriage becomes more common. Section 6 presents evidence that this has indeed happened. Section 7 discusses the diffusion of cohabiting unions from the better educated to the rest of the population, which may provide an alternative or complementary explanation for the explosion of non-marital childbearing, and section 8 presents conclusions.
Unemployment and bastardy before World War II
Taking the period from 1845 to 1960 (i.e. before the contraceptive pill), it appears that live births outside marriage per 1000 live births (bom) was a covariance-stationary series (i.e. its mean, variance and all of its autocovariances are finite and constant over time). We can reject the hypothesis that it is a 'random walk' at the 0.05 significance level, but not at the 0.01 level.
1 Modelling it as a simple auto-regressive process, we obtain the following dynamic equation: bom t =5.65 + 1.07bom t-1 -0.18bom t-2 + ε t , where t indicates year and ε t is a 'white noise' error term, estimated to have a standard deviation of 4.1 for this time period. Thus, a shock (to ε t ) raises bom further in the subsequent year, after which the impact of the shock gradually wears off. For instance, a unitary shock in year t increases bom by 0.6 in t+5.
One interpretation of these dynamics is suggested by the following identity:
where U is the population of unmarried women, M is the population of married women, and f u and f m are the fertility rates of unmarried and married women, respectively. A shock that reduces marriages in year t reduces marriages of pregnant women, which raises f u /f m in year t, and it raises U/M in the next year. This may help explain why bom rises further in t+1 after a shock in year t, after which the effect of the shock declines. One such shock is unemployment.
A simple theory of how bastards are born can be based on two premises that are supported by English socio-demographic history, outlined in the first section. The first is that getting married meant establishing a new household, which required sufficient earnings and reasonably good economic prospects. The second is that premarital sex was not uncommon, particularly when both partners had the intention of marrying one another at the time of the sexual act, and contraception was usually not practised and inefficient when it was. For instance, there is evidence that in rural England in the latter eighteenth and the nineteenth century 30-40% of brides had a birth within 8 months of marriage (Hair 1970, women. Each variable 'Granger-causes' the other. 4 The negative impact of marriages on bom one year later is consistent with the simple theory's prediction that shocks that reduce marriages increase births outside marriage.
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One such shock may be poorer labour market conditions, as indicated by a higher unemployment rate. Southall and Gilbert (1996) Oosterveen et al, 1980 , Smout, 1980 . Note that, because bom is a random walk during this period, persistently higher or lower unemployment would alter the trend in bom, but in fact the unemployment rate fluctuated around a constant mean of about 5.8%.
During the inter-war period, the relationship between bastardy and unemployment appears to have disappeared. This is suggested by Figure 3 , and the second set of parameter estimates in Table 2 confirms this. Note that marriages of single women continue to be discouraged by higher unemployment, but with nearly complete recovery in the following year. The absence of an impact of unemployment on births outside marriage may reflect the pervasive culture of sexual restraint that had evolved by the inter-war years. It could also be the case that, by sharply diminishing economic prospects, the very high level of inter-war unemployment discouraged childbearing generally, so that abstinence was more likely to be practised in the lead-up to a marriage. As a consequence, fewer women became pregnant before marriage, thereby sharply reducing the impact of unemployment on births outside marriage. It is certainly the case that the general fertility rate was much lower in the inter-war period than in the decade before the First World War (70 births per 1000 women aged 15-44 compared with 104; see Figure 1 ).
In the discussion of the long-term changes in bastardy in the pre-World War II years it has been necessary to rely on the proportion of births outside marriage as its indicator. But as the identity in (1) indicates, this proportion depends on non-marital and marital fertility rates and the proportion of women of fertile ages who are not married. All of these are affected by changes in the age distribution of the female population. For the years preceding 1938 it is not possible to obtain annual estimates of the marital status distribution of the population by age, and this explains the reliance on the overall bom indicator. The next section focuses on accounting for changes in bom over the period since 1938, when such information is available. Figure 4 shows the age-specific fertility rates outside marriage, a direct measure of the propensity to have a birth outside marriage relative to the 'population at risk'. After the Second World War 'spike', these non-marital fertility rates did not return to their 1938 levels, and from the mid-1950s they increased dramatically for all age groups, peaking in 1964 (for those aged 20-34) and then declining until the mid-1970s. As comparison with Figure 5 indicates, marital fertility rates showed a similar 'baby boom and bust' pattern, but rose and fell proportionately less around their much higher levels. Figure 4 suggests no clear relationship between non-marital birth rates and the unemployment rate.
Demographic Accounting, 1938-2003
The number of births outside marriage among women in the j-th age group in
, where Pop t is the female population aged 15-34 in year t, a tj is the proportion of the population aged 15-34 in the j-th age group, m tj is the proportion of the female population in the j-th age group who are married, and fom tj is the fertility rate of the unmarried women in the jth age group. 6 The number of births inside marriage for women in the j-th age group is defined analogously:
, where fim tj is the fertility rate of married women in the j-th age group. Then the proportion of births to women aged 15-34 outside marriage is given by:
where ∑ j indicates summation over the four five-year age groups 15-19, 20-24, 25-29 and 30-34. We can decompose changes in bom t between any two years by holding each of the various components of BOM tj and BIM tj constant at base year values. Figure 4 shows that the age-specific fertility rates of unmarried women increased from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s and then were relatively constant after that, at levels higher than at the 1964 peak. Age-specific fertility rates of married women aged 20-34 exhibited a moderate upward trend ( Figure 5 ). The big change is the large rise in the proportion of women who are not married during the post-1975 period, as shown in Figure 6 . 7 The corresponding percentages for births to women of all ages were 4.3% and 7.2%. The shift from legal marriage to cohabiting unions as the common mode of first partnership mainly accounts for the delay of first marriage in Britain and the rise in the proportion of women not married (Ermisch and Francesconi 2000) . Among women born in the 1950s, about one-fourth cohabited in their first live-in partnership.
This proportion increased to three-fifths among women born in the 1960s and to 85% among women born in the 1970s. 9 But there has also been a delay in the age of first partnership: comparing women born in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the median age at first partnership has risen from 22 to 24 to 25, respectively. Section 7 discusses possible reasons for the diffusion of cohabiting unions.
These are, of course, accounting exercises. Similar socio-economic factors may have produced the rise in cohabitation, the delay in first partnership and an increase in the propensity to have children outside marriage, making the changes in non-marital fertility rates and the changes in proportions married interdependent. Marriage markets are subject to frictions. It takes time to meet potentially suitable members of the opposite sex and gather information, and whom one meets is a stochastic process. These market frictions affect who marries whom, the gains from each marriage and the distribution of gains between spouses. They also open the possibility of childbearing outside marriage as a rational choice, even when a woman can control her fertility perfectly. 10 When a man and woman are in a relationship, the man can choose whether to marry the woman or not, if she will have him. While a woman faces the same choice when she meets a man, she can also choose to have a child by the man and then raise it without the father. Depending on the social welfare system she faces, and whether the father is willing to contribute resources, a woman's welfare when raising a child by herself may be greater than what she obtains when single and childless. But there are also costs in terms of future marriage market prospects associated with raising a child alone. A single woman with child may find it more difficult to meet potential husbands while looking after a child. A woman who has a relationship with a man she does not wish to marry, or who will not marry her, would choose to have a child by the man if the short-run gain exceeds the longterm costs in terms of her marriage prospects.
The decision to have a child outside marriage
An important implication of this model is that couples who find each other to be mutually acceptable marriage partners wait to have children within marriage, while a woman may have a child outside marriage if this is not the case. This suggests that sexual relationships that produce a child outside marriage should be much less likely to lead to marriage than those that do not. In general it is difficult to observe the outcomes of relationships, but we can observe the outcome of cohabiting unions, which have become widespread in recent years. The evidence indicates that cohabiting unions that produce children are much less likely to be converted into marriage and more likely to break up than childless ones (Ermisch and Francesconi, 2000) . About 65% of these fertile unions dissolve, compared with 40% of childless unions. Births in cohabiting unions make up 60% of recent non-marital births.
Those women who expect to obtain a significant increase in welfare when they marry suffer a greater long-term cost by having a child while single than women whose marriage prospects are such that they expect to gain little from marriage. Thus, women with poorer marriage prospects are more likely to have children outside marriage. If marriage market prospects are worse for poorer women (e.g. those with low educational attainments), because they can only marry poorer men, we would expect that poorer women would be more likely to have children before marriage, a prediction which is repeatedly confirmed (e.g. Ermisch 2001; Del Bono 2004) .
Conditions of higher unemployment tend to reduce men's incomes, particularly those men whom women with poorer marriage market attributes might have a chance of marrying. Thus, the value of waiting childless for the right man to come along is reduced relative to the utility of having a child as a single mother in labour markets in which the unemployment rate is higher. Poor employment opportunities also reduce a woman's opportunity cost of having a child on her own.
Thus, like our simple theory of section 2, this model also leads us to expect that a higher unemployment rate increases childbearing outside marriage, a relationship that we found in the aggregate data during the pre-World War I era, but which disappeared during the inter-war period. Analysis of a large cohort of women born in 1970 (Del Bono 2004) , who were making childbearing and partnership decisions in the late 1980s and 1990s, indicates that women living in counties with higher male unemployment were more likely to become a mother outside a live-in partnership and less likely to enter a partnership. This is consistent with the model's prediction.
A woman's welfare as a single mother (and possibly the amount by which being a single mother reduces her subsequent marriage prospects) is affected by any 'social stigma' attached to being a single mother. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, 'Illegitimacy continued to carry a great stigma.' (Szreter 1996 , p.577) For women who object to abortion, this stigma increases the chances that she marries if she becomes pregnant and reduces the odds of a birth outside marriage. If such stigma declines, then more women would decide to have a child (on her own) with a man whom she rejects as husband (or who rejects her as a wife), and among women who object to abortion, fewer would marry in response to a pregnancy. The next section presents a social interaction model that can produce rapid erosion of such stigma, which would both increase childbearing outside marriage directly and increase the single population.
Social influence and interaction
Suppose that the utility associated with being a single mother relative to the utility associated with remaining childless is larger when more women in her reference group (e.g. defined by nationality, religious or ethnic group) become mothers outside marriage. This may be because social stigma is less when more women become single mothers. Then the probability that a woman becomes a single mother when she and her partner do not agree to marry depends on the expected proportion of women in a woman's reference group who have their first birth outside marriage in this situation. 11 Social influence (or social stigma) effects imply that a higher expected proportion of non-marital fertility in a woman's reference group would increase an 11 The social stigma (or social contagion) model can be written as P= H[α + βP e + z′η], where P is the probability that a women becomes a single mother, P e is the expected proportion becoming a single mother in that person's 'reference group, z denotes a vector of individual attributes, H[⋅] is a specified continuous, strictly increasing distribution function, such as the logistic distribution, and α, β and η are parameters. Social stigma or social influence effects would imply β>0. See Ermisch (2003, Chapter 11) for details on the model. individual's probability of becoming a single mother. This is what we shall call a social interaction effect.
A social equilibrium occurs when people's expectations are consistent with the average proportion in the reference group who become single mothers when a couple does not marry; that is, when the actual proportion in the reference group is equal to the expected proportion. The non-linear curve in Figure 7 In the spirit of Schelling (1978) , assume the following dynamics. A birth cohort of young women base their expectations on the behaviour of the preceding birth cohort. Starting at any value of the expected proportion above the one corresponding to equilibrium B in Figure 7 , the proportion who become single mothers in the current cohort will exceed their expectations, which increases the expected proportion in the succeeding cohort. Some people with attributes who would not have had a child outside marriage at a lower expected proportion becoming single mothers now have a child rather than remain single and childless. This behaviour raises the proportion becoming single mothers and increases the expected value for the next cohort and so forth until the society converges to a "pervasive nonmarital childbearing" equilibrium at point C.
Conversely, starting at values of the expected proportion below the one associated with the equilibrium at B, the proportion of the current cohort becoming single mothers will be less than they expected, and so the succeeding cohort has lower expectations. People who would have become a single mothers if more of their peers did, will not do so, leading to lower expectations for the next cohort and so on, ultimately producing a "rare non-marital childbearing" equilibrium at A. With these dynamics, the equilibrium at B is clearly unstable, and so there are only two stable equilibrium candidates.
Initial expectations can, therefore, be important in Note that all of these cohorts 'come of age' in the postpill era. The dependent variable of interest is the 'hazard rate' of a pre-marital first birth for woman j at age t, denoted h jt . Women are assumed to be at risk for such a birth from the age of 14, and they drop out of the population at risk when they marry or when they have a first birth. Women who remained childless and never-married from age 14 to the time of the last survey in which they are present remain in the population at risk until the time of their last interview. Thus, there are two groups who are 'censored': those who marry childless and those who neither marry, nor have a child before the time they are interviewed last.
In order to have a simple parameter to compare across cohorts, a 'proportional hazard' model is estimated for each cohort; it takes the form
where E j =1 denotes a woman leaving education with 'low qualifications' and E j =0 denotes a woman with higher qualifications. The function g(t) is an unspecified function of age. This model has the property that, for two women j and k, the ratio of their hazard rates is equal to h jt /h kt = exp[β(E j -E k )]. The parameter β is estimated by Cox's partial likelihood method, and Table 3 reports the estimate of exp(β), which is the ratio of the pre-marital birth hazard of a woman with 'low education' to that of a woman with 'high education'. The estimates of this hazard ratio increase across cohorts, which is consistent with the emergence of a 'high level equilibrium' for less educated women. Table 4 breaks down non-marital first births between those before the first live-in partnership and those in the first cohabiting union. In each case, the hazard ratio is higher for later birth cohorts, particularly for births outside of a live-in partnership.
A survivor function is associated with any hazard function. In this case it is the proportion surviving childless and never-married. Tables 3 and 4 report the chisquare statistic of the log-rank test for the equality of the survivor functions of the two education groups. The value of the test statistic clearly increases for more recent cohorts, indicating bigger differences in their survival functions. Thus, this nonparametric test also supports the emergence of larger educational differences, which may have been driven by social interaction effects.
The diffusion of cohabiting unions
An alternative, but also possibly complementary, explanation is that the large rise in the proportion of women who cohabit in their first partnership (rather than marry) is responsible for the dramatic increase in bastardy in the last quarter century. The reason that this may be the case follows from examining the dynamics of cohabiting 13 See Appendix for further details. I am grateful to Chiara Pronzato for constructing the demographic unions. Analysis of the BHPS data indicates that the time spent living together in cohabiting unions before either marrying each other or the union dissolving is usually very short-the median duration was about 2 years for women born in the 1950s and 1960s, rising to 3.5 years for those born in the 1970s. There has been an upward trend in the proportion of women's first cohabiting unions that dissolve rather than turn into marriage: 30%, 37% and 50% for women born in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, respectively. Most of those who re-partner after their cohabiting union dissolved also start their next partnership by cohabiting. It takes about 2 years for one-half to have formed a new partnership, which is again subject to the high risk of dissolution. Thus, the time spent cohabiting, the relatively high risk that the union dissolves and the time it takes to cohabit again all contribute to a longer time before any marriage takes place and, therefore, more time at risk to have a birth outside marriage. Adding to this time at risk is the delay in first partnerships for more recent cohorts discussed earlier. At fixed average age-specific fertility rates outside of a live-in partnership and in cohabiting unions, the increase in the exposure time to these non-marital birth rates would have increased non-marital childbearing. This is consistent with the large accounting contribution of the decline in the proportion of women married to the rise in the proportion of births outside marriage discussed in section 3.
But why didn't average non-marital fertility rates fall when more women cohabited? Women had the means (contraception and legal abortion) to avoid nonmarital childbearing if they wanted to do so, and so the substitution of cohabiting unions for marriages need not have raised non-marital fertility. This consideration leads us back to the explanations suggested by the models in sections 4 and 5:
purposeful decisions to have a child outside marriage and erosion of the stigma history files combining retrospective and prospective panel information.
against doing so. Also, the demographic accounting begs the question: why did cohabiting unions become the common type of first partnership, and why was first partnership delayed? If there was initially social stigma operating against cohabitation, its dramatic increase may be due to a social interaction model like that outlined in section 5, applied to cohabiting unions. It could also be the case that cohabiting unions and partnership delay were only attractive when the stigma associated with childbearing outside marriage was less important.
In addition to the contraceptive pill and legal abortion, another possible driving force for change in patterns of first partnership may have been important changes in young people's education. For instance, one-third of 18-year olds were in full-time education in 1992, compared with 15 per cent in 1979. Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1993) argue that young men who expect to prosper in later life will postpone marriage until their success becomes evident to potential marriage partners.
Those who do not expect their economic status to advance much will seek to marry at a relatively young age. The careers of those who obtain university degrees take longer to develop and their earnings peak later in their life. Thus, as more young men go on to higher education, the proportion of young men who think it is worth waiting to signal their better economic status is likely to increase. The same may now apply to women, and also women who are university graduates prefer to marry graduate men.
Beyond a certain age, young people may nevertheless prefer to have a live-in partner, particularly in an era of reliable contraception, and cohabiting unions cater for this preference while allowing them to postpone making a long-term commitment.
Thus, higher educational achievement would both encourage young people to enter live-in partnerships later and to cohabit when they do. The short spells of cohabitation that are observed are consistent with the argument that it is used while waiting to signal economic success and as a learning experience before stronger commitments are made. The social interaction model outlined above could explain why cohabitation spread so rapidly in response to these stronger incentives to cohabit before marriage, even if the incentives were confined to those with higher educational attainments. Table 5 Through its link to the widespread substitution of cohabiting unions for direct marriage, the increase in non-marital childbearing may, therefore, be due in part to the expansion of higher education acting in conjunction with social interaction effects.
For this argument to be correct it is not necessary to show that university graduates were themselves having children in cohabiting unions to a significant degree (they were not). They were the pioneers of cohabiting unions, but social interaction effects spread them widely through society, to people who would have stronger incentives to have children within such unions (see section 4).
Conclusions
Over This was partly driven by a steep increase in age-specific non-marital births rates among women aged 20-34 from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, after which they stabilised at a high level. At fixed average non-marital and marital age-specific birth rates, this increase in the proportion of births outside marriage can be mainly accounted for by a large fall in the proportion of women aged 20-34 who are married, which is in turn associated with a dramatic rise in cohabiting unions. These unions are short-lived before either dissolving or being converted into marriage. But this begs the question: why didn't average non-marital fertility rates fall when more women cohabited? Women had the means (reliable contraception and legal abortion) to avoid non-marital childbearing if they wanted to do so, and so the substitution of cohabiting unions for marriages need not have raised non-marital fertility.
A theory of marriage market search (courtship) in which out-of-wedlock childbearing is an option suggests why it may be a rational choice, even when fertility can be controlled. A woman's welfare as a single mother is likely to be influenced by the prevalence of single mothers in the population, which may reflect social stigma against single mothers. When their prevalence is low, non-marital childbearing is discouraged. A temporary change in the determinants of non-marital childbearing that raises it, like the large rise in unemployment in the late 1970s/early 1980s, can produce rapid erosion of the stigma and a self-reinforcing rise in childbearing outside marriage. This dynamic is likely to be concentrated among a segment of the population who already has stronger incentives to have a child before marriage. If this social influence model is valid, then it is likely to be the case that socio-economic differences in the chances of having a child before marriage widen as childbearing outside marriage becomes more common, and the paper provides evidence that this has happened. An alternative, or complementary, explanation stresses the role of the rise in cohabiting unions and delay in partnership. These generated an increase in nonmarital births by increasing the unmarried population. This view also points to the operation of a social influence model in explaining the dramatic rise in cohabitation, and the paper provides evidence of a diffusion of cohabiting unions from the better educated to the less educated population. 1 8 6 0 1 8 6 3 1 8 6 6 1 8 6 9 1 8 7 2 1 8 7 5 1 8 7 8 1 8 8 1 1 8 8 4 1 8 8 7 1 8 9 0 1 8 9 3 1 8 9 6 1 8 9 9 1 9 0 2 1 9 0 5 1 9 0 8 1 9 1 1 1 9 1 4 1 9 1 7 1 9 2 0 1 9 2 3 1 9 2 6 1 9 2 9 1 9 3 2 1 9 3 5 1 9 3 8 Year 1 8 7 4 1 8 7 7 1 8 8 0 1 8 8 3 1 8 8 6 1 8 8 9 1 8 9 2 1 8 9 5 1 8 9 8 1 9 0 1 1 9 0 4 1 9 0 7 1 9 1 0 1 9 1 3 1 9 1 6 1 9 1 9 1 9 2 2 1 9 2 5 1 9 2 8 1 9 3 1 1 9 3 4 1 9 3 7 1 9 4 0 Year 
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